Did Yaakov take advantage of Esav? Did Esav really sell the birthright for lentil stew? Was the deal fair - or even valid? We examine the different ideologies underpinning their decisions -and our decisions in determining fairness.
Esav comes home famished after a long day out in the field, and he is looking for something to eat. Yaakov has a kitchen brimming with good things, but he is missing one (spiritual) seasoning – and its name is Birthright. It seems that Esav, though, does not value the birthright’s spiritual benefits at all; moreover, he scoffs at its perceived importance. The transaction that emerges – the birthright in exchange for lentil stew – appears to be an excellent one, wherein all parties benefit and none lose out.
Another point of view would be that the transaction is not equal or fair: Yaakov has the stronger position because he knows the value of the birthright that belongs to Esav. Esav believes that he is outwitting Yaakov and receiving a free meal, but Yaakov understands very well that he is acquiring – at no cost – something that is impossible to come by, even for all the money in the world.
This “exchange” is reminiscent of ancient explorers and traders selling cheap colorful beads in exchange for gold and diamonds (to people who weren’t aware that these metals and stones were worth much more to these traders). Is this a fair deal?
Most commentators assume that the transaction appears to be unfair. They rush to explain why Esav’s state of extreme hunger does not cancel the transaction, turning it into a contract that was signed under duress and thus invalid. They point out that even after Esav has eaten, the Torah clearly states “Esav scorned the birthright.” Others noted the difficulty arising from Esav’s acceptance of deal wherein he sells the birthright as a loss. They argue that there is additional monetary compensation that is not written in the text, i.e. Yaakov pays Esav in full for the birthright – the lentil stew is merely the symbolic act of the transfer.
I would like to argue that, from the outset, the deal is a fair one. Deciding the question of the transaction’s fairness hinges on a key question: Does Esav sell the birthright out of his own free will?
It is important to determine whether the act was one of free will. But must we also determine whether Esav understood the significance of the birthright, and whether his motive for selling it is considered a reasonable motive for a reasonable person?
“Esav said: Here I am, going to die, and of what use is this birthright to me?” (Genesis 25:32).
The words that the Torah puts in Esav’s mouth are not connected to his immediate state of hunger. Esav’s words reflect a reasonable worldview, according to the Mishnaic Sages in Ethics of the Fathers: “Know where you came from, and where you are going”(3:1). Though Esav is young (fifteen years old), he constantly feels the dread of death which is looming. Awareness of death arouses thoughts of powerlessness, emptiness, and oblivion in Esav (See Hizkuni on Genesis 28:32). Kohelet also describes that “Man is going to his eternal home [i.e. the grave]” (Ecclesiastes 12:5) – he, too, faces the journey of life while constantl focusing on its endpoint, and minimizes the value of action and innovation.
What is the practical outcome of feeling constantly faced with oblivion? Esav concludes that the motto to live by is “eat and drink, because tomorrow we will die.” Being faced with death, according to Esav, dwarfs every possible achievement or acquisition that has an abstract or intangible aspect to it. He is left with survival as the highest value in life. Esav chooses to maximize hedonistic enjoyment of the moment. He chooses to view life as a one-time event to be used to its best advantage for man’s benefit.
Yaakov’s ideological choice is the opposite of Esav’s: it places the moment of death as a an opportunity for self-reflection, a sensational insight that influences every moment of life, and which brings the question of eternity to the forefront. Minimizing the importance of the fleeting present moments defines the ability to make one’s mark– not only for the tangible benefit of the individual, but also as aan opportunity to leave a lasting legacy, one that may endure even after death. According to this approach, attaining eternal life occurs because of the unique memory that one leaves behind—someone who invests in the future of his descendants, who endows his progeny with strength of character, knowledge, ideas, and insight.
We can see that Yaakov and Esav have disparate worldviews that are rooted in different existential philosophical ponderings. From Yaakov’s perspective, Esav’s response seems ludicrous – and vice versa. All of these considerations point us to a transaction that is completely fair. The two parties consider the matterand express interest in the exchange as it stands. But now we find that what determines the fairness of a financial transaction is itself subject to a philosophical question: Does “taking advantage” occur only when one side is cognitively weaker, or does it also occur if he merely has faulty reasoning? Is the determining factor freedom of choice and the awareness of free will, or is it some objective truth? The opinion claiming that Yaakov takes advantage of Esav requires that we view Yaakov’s outlook as superior, as does the midrash that describes Esav’s words as heretical. The liberal view would say that the transaction is fair because it involves the full and free consent of both parties, the crucial factor determining the validity of the deal.
Contemporary legislative and legal systems debate about the definition of marriage. Marriage can be thought of as a legal connection binding a couple, a contract of which its content and obligations are subject to the full discretion and judgment of the connected parties. Alternatively, marriage can be viewed as a connection subject to a full, already-present system of rights and obligations of the two parties, ranging from sustenance to intimacy.
It seems that the choice between these two systems touches on the ideological question of what is right. Is it right to impose values that seem worthy, or is it right to allow for space that will be filled in by reasonable, thinking people. Grappling with the idea of who has a grasp on truth is part of grappling with different values – the value of respect vs. the value of freedom. From the “values-based” outlook, Esav agrees to and wants the exchange. Additionally, Esav believes that the principles that apply to transactions need to be coherent within a worldview that values freedom – a worldview to which he subscribes, as we can see from his life decisions. Esav’s philosophical stance is accepted; in Parashat Toldot, the Torah’s description presents the transaction as valid. Yaakov gains the birthright and the blessings, and Esav gains a lentil stew.